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PERSONNEL RECOVERY UPDATE

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Message from the DASD

As we begin a new year, it is appropriate to reflect on the past year with pride in the collective efforts of our personnel recovery community. We've taken great strides to arm our service members and government service employees with the knowledge, equipment and training essential to "bring them home with honor," should they ever become isolated.

Good news dominated the personnel recovery arena in 2003. One of our most significant initiatives was our sponsorship of a landmark study to determine what a National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRa) should look like—what it should include. In partnership with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), we are making significant progress with the NPRa study. It examines, from a macro U.S. Government perspective, how we should address personnel recovery in the interagency environment. From training through the initial notification process and actual recovery activity, to the safe return or accounting for our isolated personnel, the NPRa addresses the entire spectrum of personnel recovery.

We expect the NPRa to deliver sufficient information and direction to enable us to craft a National Security Presidential Directive that incorporates guidance for inter-service and interagency coordination during recovery events. Our objective is to ensure that deployed government personnel have the maximum possible standard of training, equipment, and capability to survive any isolating event. For the first time, members from throughout the personnel recovery community are working together to solidify those inter-service and interagency responsibilities associated with personnel recovery events.

Additionally, we published and implemented a new policy instruction to train high-risk-of-exploitation DoD civilian and contractor employees to survive isolation and capture. DoDI 1300.23 directs the Components to train these personnel to have a more complete understanding of the U.S. Government's expectations regarding their actions, should they ever become isolated as a result of their employment activities.

Now is an exciting time to be a part of the transformation of personnel recovery—Geographic Combatant Command and Service personnel recovery

council and working group meetings are producing results and increasing visibility of recovery issues at the highest levels. The Personnel Recovery Advisory Group is another very successful forum in which our key senior personnel recovery executives meet, discuss the key issues, and provide meaningful guidance to the field. We have other successful venues that also further personnel recovery goals. The Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group successfully addressed key technology issues this year and fostered the formation of the Personnel Recovery Technology Interoperability Working Group, which focuses on recovery-related technology issues at the grass-roots level. Finally, the Personnel Recovery Modernization Working Group, which has almost completed its work, will soon give us a comprehensive tool for building sound personnel recovery requirements.

Secretary Rumsfeld stated quite clearly that "joint" means not only inter-service, but also coalition and interagency. We must step up to this challenge and move out smartly. My staff is working with the Services and Geographic Combatant Commands to develop a transformation policy memorandum for the Secretary's signature. To update policy and keep pace with doctrine and changes in the battlespace arising from 9/11 and the war on terror, my personnel recovery policy staff is examining all personnel recovery DoD directives and instructions to incorporate changes as necessary. Our goal, with your help, is to ensure we not only capture the push towards transformation, but also incorporate the significant lessons learned from ALLIED FORCE, the EP-3 incident, and Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM.

2003 was a year filled with progress and many successes in the personnel recovery arena. As we begin the new year, I challenge each of you to join with DPMO to seize upon the momentum of those successes.

We all have a sacred obligation to recover our personnel when operations do not go as planned, and we will work tirelessly to return them home with honor.

— Jerry D. Jennings



National Personnel Recovery Architecture Interim Report

By Scott Feil
Institute for Defense Analyses



The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) has delivered its interim report to the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) on establishing a National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA). At the mid-point of a two-year effort,

the Institute's team of analysts has outlined a set of recommendations that build on the success in personnel recovery operations the Department of Defense achieved recently, and to enhance the national capability of the U.S. Government to recover isolated persons working overseas in furtherance of American interests.

With the Global War on Terrorism ongoing and changes in the role of American military, economic, and political power that require more international presence in smaller deployments within a more dynamic security situation, the pool of U.S. Government military, civilian, and contract personnel who are at risk of isolation, detention, or capture has risen dramatically. Government agencies are becoming increasingly aware of this potential and are ready to work together to train their personnel and pool resources to achieve synergy in personnel recovery capabilities. While the Department of Defense has the most highly developed capabilities in this mission area, other agencies can provide capabilities of their own and can train their personnel, leaders and staffs, and forces. To date, however, the increased risk government workers face overseas has not been matched by the development of interagency personnel recovery capabilities.

Congress mandated and funded the DPMO-sponsored NPRA study. IDA is a non-profit Federally Funded Research and Development Center that conducts independent analyses in support of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands. The objectives of the study are to define a national personnel recovery baseline; develop a strategic vision for personnel recovery; compare the baseline to the vision, identifying capabilities, shortfalls and gaps; and finally, identify and describe alternatives to improve the architecture and achieve the national vision. Subsequent efforts will address activities to implement the recommendations.

In conducting the NPRA study, the IDA team built on previous efforts in the Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) Joint Test and Evaluation, a coalition personnel recovery study, and research and interviews. Through visits with a wide range of government departments, agencies and subordinate bureaus, the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff, a two-day workshop to refine initial findings, field observations, and case study visits to foreign countries, the IDA team developed a recommended vision for personnel recovery.

The study defines three components of a national personnel recovery architecture:

- Direct and guide personnel recovery (policy/doctrine)
- Plan and prepare for personnel recovery in terms of
 - Isolated persons
 - Leaders and staffs
 - Recovery forces
- Execute personnel recovery missions

At the mid-point of the NPRA effort, the study has yielded encouraging results and has uncovered a vast amount of work yet to be done to deliver a national personnel recovery capability. The interim report proposes a national personnel recovery vision that institutionalizes it as a joint force mission within the Department of Defense, and then builds on that concept to integrate interagency and multinational dimensions. Essential to this vision is a definition of full spectrum personnel recovery that incorporates and integrates several different activities that actually operate according to very closely related concepts. The following definition and illustration, (shown on page 3), depict how many different operational communities can be brought together to provide more effective and efficient recovery capabilities.


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Personnel Recovery – Personnel Recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil preparations and efforts to recover U.S. military personnel, government civilians, and government contractors who are isolated, missing, or in distress while participating in a U.S. sponsored activity or mission, and other persons as designated by the President.



The study also describes a central need for an overarching national personnel recovery policy that will achieve the recommended vision and meet the requirements implied in the definition. Only by gaining visibility over the entire at-risk population and melding the various agencies' shortfalls and assets into a coherent set of requirements and solutions can the U.S. Government respond quickly and effectively with appropriate and available resources, plans, and procedures when personnel become isolated. Such an overarching policy would provide a common lexicon, goals and objectives for a national capability. It would provide the direction necessary to penetrate organizational boundaries and establish responsibilities and procedures for training individuals, units and staffs, and to ensure adequate pre-crisis planning and coordination. Most importantly, a national policy would codify this new, broad definition of personnel recovery that would encompass all those at risk while serving the U.S. Government overseas, including contract civilians. The draft policy statement proposes the following:

- Defining personnel recovery ("Full Spectrum") at the National/Interagency level
- Assigning specific personnel recovery responsibilities to federal departments and agencies
- Designating a single personnel recovery office within the Department of State as a counterpart to DoD's office, DPMO
- Directing interagency-wide needs assessments and funding programs
- Directing Chiefs of Mission to establish a personnel recovery coordination cell

- Directing departments and agencies to prepare, train and equip their personnel for personnel recovery events, including potentially isolated personnel, management/staffs, and recovery assets
- Directing security assistance programs to enhance host nation personnel recovery capabilities
- Directing the adoption of a civilian code of behavior for use when evading capture or when captive
- Directing the development of standardized contracting language to consider the personnel recovery aspects of performance

In addition, the interim report surveys the current capacities for training and exercising potentially isolated persons as well as the recovery staffs and forces, and examines the potential benefits of employing a code of behavior for all personnel as a basis for training and as a motivational survival tool.

It also contains descriptions of the two major settings in which personnel recovery takes place – that of a non-combat situation wherein the U.S. Chief of Mission is responsible for personnel recovery, and secondly, an active combat theater of operations wherein the Combatant Commander governs personnel recovery. Those two general situations drive complementary, but not identical processes for reporting, locating, supporting, and recovering isolated personnel. Based on the current status and the initiatives government agencies are taking to address future challenges, the study will continue to examine ways to facilitate achieving a national personnel recovery vision.

Building on continued interaction with the emerging interagency personnel recovery community, the IDA study team will continue to support the national drive to achieve an interagency capability that prepares potentially isolated persons and the government for executing their responsibilities in personnel recovery. The final study report, including concepts, alternatives, and recommendations for implementation, will be published in the Spring of 2004.

Another Viewpoint on "A Critical Step Toward Jointness" Article in the Air Power Journal

By Dan Baumgartner
Senior Policy Advisor, DPMO

I recently read an article in the Air Power Journal (September 21, 2003 issue) by Major Braganca titled "A Critical Step Toward Jointness." I was struck by two thoughts. First, it was good to see that there are still officers rising through the ranks that are doing some critical thinking about their profession of arms and are not afraid to publish their viewpoints. Second, while I thought Major Braganca

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wrote a thought-provoking piece, it occurred to me in reading his article, that there may be some misperceptions across DoD on our progress in the personnel recovery mission area since DESERT STORM. He raises good doctrinal issues and as we review current doctrine, such as Joint Publication 3-50, personnel recovery's doctrinal bible, they will be addressed. While he makes some good points, his conclusions do not track with current experiences nor do they show how much we have achieved towards transforming personnel recovery in a very short time. Today, there are exciting things happening in the personnel recovery arena, both at the OSD level and at the operational levels of the Services and Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCCs). While not there [transformation] yet, I think we can make a compelling case that Major Braganca's issues are being addressed.

In 1996, Congress passed the Missing Persons Act. A key aspect of this important piece of legislation was to merge responsibilities for past, present, and future accounting functions with policy oversight on DoD "live" personnel recovery matters. It forced DoD to consolidate OSD oversight and policy development for personnel recovery into one office. This office is responsible for the entire spectrum of issues related to recovering and accounting for Americans who are missing, and those who may become isolated in future actions. By early 2001 there were a total of five DoD directives and instructions that covered personnel recovery and focused on key sub-areas such as Repatriation, Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), and Code of Conduct Training. In 2003, we added a sixth DoD instruction governing, for the first time, the training of high-risk-of-exploitation DoD civilians and contractors to survive isolation and capture with honor.

Just as significant, and very transformational, was the move in 1998 (completed on October 1, 1999) by the Air Force and Joint Staffs to consolidate personnel recovery Executive Agent (EA) responsibilities. Prior to 1999, EA responsibilities were fragmented and lacked the joint focus necessary to push the mission area to the next transformational level. The Defense Reform Initiative Decision #29 not only consolidated all of the personnel recovery EA responsibilities under one operational command, but also moved that command from under a single service to a unified command. Service-centric attitudes, practices, and capabilities have evolved to a joint focus in the transformationally-oriented U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

With a centralized focus at the policy level in OSD and the consolidated operational and joint focus by our partners at USJFCOM, we have been able to drive many changes. Probably the most significant change is the very issue Major Braganca addresses repeatedly in his article as the "Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (JPRCC)" concept. His idea behind the JPRCC was to provide a center "for more effective joint integration," which would "significantly improve personnel recovery without slowing responsiveness

or agility during those time-critical operations." Major Braganca's idea is already fact. As directed in DoD directives and instructions, and as operationally assisted by USJFCOM's designated personnel recovery EA action office, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the GCCs, USSOCOM, and the Services have established personnel recovery focal points at the joint force headquarters and Component levels. Additionally, JPRA has funded and trained personnel recovery experts as representatives to the GCCs, USSOCOM, Joint Staff, Services, and some other governmental agency staffs. This team, with OSD policy support, is intimately involved in exactly what Major Braganca advocates as his solution to the "jointness" issue in DoD personnel recovery.

The successes of these fusion cells, though not called JPRCCs, were quite evident in U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) execution of both Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM (OEF and OIF). For the first time in U.S. history, we concluded formal hostilities with every single person either recovered or accounted for. Those missions, heavily tied into Special Operations Forces (SOF) NAR activities (by their very definition - joint) and brilliantly commanded and controlled by a (jointly trained and rehearsed) Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) tied into dozens of Component Recovery Coordination Centers, displayed remarkable "jointness" throughout the two campaigns.

At the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) meeting that Mr. Jennings hosted last September, Major General Renuart, USCENTCOM director of operations during OEF/OIF, made it very clear that despite these successes, we can always learn from our mistakes and do even better in the next joint, coalition, or interagency environment. His major points: better reporting, improved and integrated Identification-Friend-or-Foe and Blue Force Tracking, and personnel recovery education and training for commanders and their staffs, serve to remind us that 100% success does not mean perfect or even suitable for the next major engagement.

As we assess progress in the personnel recovery mission area, we see significant efforts DoD-wide. Senior DoD executives that spoke about our isolated and captured personnel in TV interviews during OIF really understood the repatriation, debriefing, and decompression process—a welcome change from past conflicts. USCENTCOM and the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) had well-planned, orchestrated, and executed repatriation processes - moving returnees efficiently from Phase I through Phase III between the supported and supporting commands. Not even close to "pick up games," these jointly-run operations worked very smoothly, capturing the tactical and strategic information needed while ensuring the health and well being of the operators.

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) are not standing idly by

"Jointness" *(Continued on page 6)*

JPRA Personnel Recovery Support Teams: From Concept to Execution in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

By Lyle Moeller, GG13, DAFC
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency



As the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) office of primary responsibility for personnel recovery, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is chartered to shape and enable the planning, preparation and execution of personnel recovery for the Department of Defense. To facilitate this effort, JPRA has recently created

Personnel Recovery Support Teams (PRSTs) to maximize support to the Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. Special Operations Command. The PRST is mission-oriented and task-organized to provide timely and effective personnel recovery subject matter experts. Support ranges from procedural training to providing guidance, advice, and assistance to Joint Force Commanders, designated Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs, and the DoD Components as they prepare for military operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. JPRA's PRSTs stand ready to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice.

Support to combat and contingency operations is a mainstay of the PRST concept. In the most recent case, preparation for personnel recovery support during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) began long before the first shot was fired. In mid-2001, JPRA dedicated a PRST with expertise in conventional and non-conventional recovery operations; survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE); intelligence; and surface-based command and control that directly supported U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) during its deliberate-planning phase with regard to full spectrum personnel recovery. In mid-2002, USCENTCOM requested JPRA deploy a PRST to conduct staff assistance visits (SAVs) and assess the personnel recovery capabilities of their Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), and Combined Forces Special Operations Component Commander (CFSOCC). The focus was on personnel recovery readiness and processes in accordance with USCENTCOM personnel recovery regulations and concept of operations in support of the war to liberate Iraq.

This SAV provided personnel recovery functional area expertise to USCENTCOM during its assessments of Component personnel recovery readiness. During the SAV, PRST members presented briefings to key leadership and provided "Just-In-Time (JIT)" training to enhance the personnel recovery readiness of USCENTCOM recovery planners and Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) personnel—all resulting in an increased awareness of the Component personnel recovery command and control nodes. The provided information also enhanced commonality of

terminology, which contributed to a fluent exchange of personnel recovery information across USCENTCOM's Area of Responsibility.

During USCENTCOM Exercise INTERNAL LOOK 03 (IL03), the PRST was requested to support USCENTCOM and its Components. The PRST comprehensively reviewed Component personnel recovery connectivity, planning processes, alignment in the personnel recovery architecture and the ability to support the effective accomplishment of personnel recovery tasks during a recovery event. The PRST also conducted detailed information briefings to key leaders and Component staffs to facilitate and foster a better understanding of the personnel recovery process while providing JIT training as needed. Following a detailed review of the IL03 observations and lessons learned, USCENTCOM transitioned from planning support into the execution phase of OIF and JPRA's PRST transitioned to a wartime support role.

JPRA received USCENTCOM's formal request for a JPRA PRST to support OIF in early February 2003. The tailored request was based on validated and specified tasks vetted by the USCENTCOM planning, training, and exercise process. JPRA functionally task-organized a PRST to ensure successful realization of the validated and specified USCENTCOM tasks. It was focused on providing direct operational support to USCENTCOM and its Components to facilitate and assist Combatant Command RCC nodes to plan and execute personnel recovery, to include repatriation. The key to the success of JPRA's PRST support was the continued involvement and relentless coordination by the USCENTCOM personnel recovery office of primary responsibility and JPRA's own USCENTCOM representative.

The outcome resulted in the JPRA PRST providing conventional personnel recovery specialists to the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) and CFACC RCC-North, as well as the CFLCC's V Corps RCC; an intelligence specialist to the JSRC and the Joint Intelligence Center at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC); Non-conventional Assisted Recovery specialists to CFSOCC's Unconventional Assisted Rescue Coordination Center (UARCC) and JSOTF-North, and SERE specialists at the JSRC and Task Force 20.

The specified tasks of the PRST request were to:

- Assist in the establishment of initial operation, and support to the JSRC, CFACC RCC-North, UARCC and JSOTF-North, while facilitating the integration of all dedicated and available

"PRST" (Continued on page 9)

“Jointness” (Continued from page 4)

either. Patterned off of a “stoplight” chart the USEUCOM staff developed to depict their recovery capabilities, USPACOM has performed an in-depth assessment and moved out with personnel recovery planning. Personnel recovery planning is a high priority for their flag staffs as they address the war on terror and the integration of all the joint forces involved in personnel recovery events. USSOUTHCOM has nearly completed its Mission Area Analysis and this seminal piece of work has become the template of interagency personnel recovery operations for DoD. The unique environment of Central and South America, and the various U.S. Government agencies that hold stakes there, present some formidable challenges. The USSOUTHCOM staff has already taken this on for action.

The Services continue making progress. Every Service staff has a designated personnel recovery focal point, if not a full office dedicated to service personnel recovery matters. Each has developed or is close to completing a comprehensive Service repatriation plan. The Army recently established a personnel recovery office under the G-3, coordinated a final draft of a sweeping, first-ever personnel recovery policy directive; and had its first Service personnel recovery conference in November 2003. They plan to have a second conference in the Spring with a joint audience. The Air Force combined its headquarters personnel recovery staff elements with their SOF staff partners just as the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) assumed the rescue mission from the Air Combat Command (ACC). While the move sparked some spirited debate across the personnel recovery community, SOF recovery successes in OEF and OIF give the move a positive spin in consolidated resources and efforts. The Navy was the first Service to stand up a peacetime Code of Conduct course to address hostage and governmental detention--the two captivity environments our personnel are more likely to face in today's world. Finally, the Marines institutionalized joint personnel recovery training for every Marine Expeditionary Force prior to their deployment.

Critical to transformation of our personnel recovery capabilities are education and training. DoD personnel recovery education continues to accelerate with courses being developed for every aspect of the personnel recovery mission and for every level of command and control within the personnel recovery arena. The two most successful to date, PR-101, *Fundamentals of Personnel Recovery*, and PR-301, *Personnel Recovery Plans and Operations*, have provided a baseline of joint planning and operational expertise over the past two years that is evident with the recent successes in all of the GCCs. Personnel recovery education is being addressed in Professional Military Education (PME) courses like the Joint Forces Staff College elective PR-110, *Personnel Recovery Fundamentals for the Joint Staff Officer*, and in venues for senior executives with PR-189, *Personnel Recovery for Senior Leaders Seminar*.

Two of the newest personnel recovery courses are PR-103, *Personnel Recovery Fundamentals for Allies and Coalition Partners*, and PR-303, *NAR Plans and Operations*. JPRA continues to fill the educational gaps for personnel recovery as time and resources permit.

The transformation of personnel recovery in DoD is occurring in many venues. GCC and Service Personnel Recovery Council and Working Group meetings are producing results and more importantly, visibility on personnel recovery issues. The PRAG provides a parallel venue to work policy-level issues with the key senior executives in the personnel recovery community. More active than ever before, the PRAG supports transformational concepts like the Core Captivity Curriculum (moving toward joint Code of Conduct training), and the Transitional Architecture. This architecture is the first step towards ensuring interoperability of current survival radios as DoD embraces the transformational Joint Tactical Radio System.

Pursuing a Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group recommendation, JPRA established the more operationally-oriented Personnel Recovery Technology Interoperability Working Group (PRTIWG) to address key personnel recovery technology issues with a primary focus on integration and interoperability. The 2002 Worldwide Personnel Recovery Conference and the PRTIWG were directly responsible for creating the Personnel Recovery Modernization Working Group. Focusing on the isolated person, recovery force, and commanders and staffs, this group defined the requirements and produced a personnel recovery modernization plan.

We continue to transform our recovery capabilities to meet the needs of the current and future battlefield at the OSD level as well. The DPMO staff is reviewing and revising, as necessary, the personnel recovery DoD directives and instructions to ensure we not only push towards transformation, but also incorporate the significant lessons learned from ALLIED FORCE, the EP-3 incident, and OEF/OIF. We have also made significant progress on the Congressionally-directed National Personnel Recovery Architecture study to determine the requirements of a national personnel recovery architecture that is examining how to address the interagency environment from the macro U.S. Government level. The primary deliverable of the study is a National Security Policy Directive that will not only help direct traffic with regard to personnel recovery in the government, but also ensure all U.S. Government personnel deployed with DoD personnel have a minimum standard of training, equipment, and capability so our personnel are not endangered by their deficiencies.

The training, education, planning, rehearsals, and execution currently seen across DoD should be cause for optimism about the direction we are taking to transform personnel recovery in DoD. Are we there yet? No, I don't think so, but we are quantum leaps ahead of where we were

“Jointness” (Concludes on page 10)

A Different PR for Public Affairs Training

By Colonel J.R. Atkins
Deputy Commander, JPRA



Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) quickly recognize “PR” as the long-standing abbreviation for “Public Relations.” There is, however, another newer definition for “PR” in DoD. It is “Personnel Recovery.” Although the two “PR” mission areas may be dissimilar, the success in the PR (Personnel

Recovery) mission is highly dependent on an effective PR (Public Relations) effort. The two functions overlap. For the purposes of this article, we’ll use “PR” for Personnel Recovery, and “PA” for Public Affairs.

PA support to the PR mission most often covers the spectrum—from DoD updates, to national level media—including print, television and radio—to ensuring individual families receive timely information concerning their loved ones. It is imperative that both mission areas have a complete understanding of each other’s information requirements. Educating all the participants is the key to success. Education includes, but is not limited to:

- Dissemination of information designed to support and enhance conditions DoD personnel experience during isolation
- Enhanced and smoother information flow extending from the isolating event through a successful repatriation
- Education of the public with correct terminology and procedures, and factual information; and finally
- Decision-makers that are armed with accurate information concerning the status, condition, and plan for handling isolated personnel

The end result of such an education effort will be a much more efficient operating environment to accomplish both PR and PA operations—especially those with the very highest profiles. Properly educating all PA officials involved in the PR process would help to minimize speculation by the media and well-meaning individuals, who, without proper information or training, can cause irreparable harm to ongoing operations and negatively influence the chances of success.

Let’s take a look at a few “lessons learned” from recent PR events and where things can go wrong. Arguably, the most politically and emotionally charged PR events are those that comprise the repatriation process and ultimately return loved ones to health, psychological stability, and full reintegration with family and service.

The repatriation of the three Army soldiers held in Kosovo during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999 brought

to light an example of well-meaning people who, armed with the wrong perceptions, made the repatriation process more difficult. Some senior officials thought it would be helpful to reunite the troops with their families as soon as possible after they arrived (right off the plane) in Germany. While on the surface this seems to be in the best interest of the returnee, countless debriefs have demonstrated that it can actually slow the repatriation process and is not always helpful to the well-being of the returnee. The most important process that must take precedence over all others is to allow time for the returnee to decompress from what can be severe captivity stresses, and to tell his or her story to DoD debriefers.

A thorough debriefing will assess the condition of the returnee and help them assess their performance during isolation and captivity—a “report card” so to speak. It is important to returnees’ mental and physical well-being to know they comported themselves with honor. That assessment facilitates closure on the event. Immediate reunification with family often delays this process and tends to increase the stress on the returnee.

Another lesson learned that highlighted how the lack of education on the repatriation process can hamper reintegration of returnees was the return of the EP-3 crew from their captivity in China in 2001. Originally, repatriation planners scheduled the crew’s decompression and debriefing period to last 96 hours. The unusual circumstances of their forced landing and captivity necessitated a well-planned and thorough repatriation plan. Since the crew’s release was just before the Easter holiday, though, pressure was brought to bear to get the returnees home in time to celebrate Easter with their families, thus curtailing the time available for decompression and debriefings. Though well-intentioned, this decision ultimately reduced the effectiveness of the repatriation process. Following the break in the repatriation process for the holiday, a period lasting a little over a month, when the detainees were reunited with each other it was obvious that the break had presented some additional decompression challenges that extended their complete reintegration.

The good news is that we haven’t lost these and other lessons. The most recent example of a PR event that was handled very well with excellent results for the returnee—despite the stratospheric level of national interest in her plight—was the return of Private Jessica Lynch. Advance work by PR experts teamed with the PA officials significantly helped the family deal with her situation, understand her experience, and stay “on message” during her isolation and eventual repatriation. Education of the PA personnel (and integrating them with PR experts) and senior

“Different” (Concludes on page 9)

A View From Within...

Intelligence Support to the Joint Search and Rescue Center

By Ms. Catherine Oemig
DIA, POW/MIA Cell



I really didn't know what to expect when I arrived at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia. Sure, I had been to PSAB a couple of times before, but this time was different—we were getting ready for war. Even without knowing the exact start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, I still knew it was going to begin soon. While we waited, in addition to revising the Joint Search and Rescue Center's (JSRC) Intelligence operating procedures, the Director also wanted me to run the JSRC's intelligence section. The initial plan was for me to make sure the JSRC's intelligence section was running smoothly, then to turn the section back over to the military and make myself available as an advisor.

In the two weeks before the war started, we coordinated with the other intelligence cells, and discussed the external support the JSRC would need during an actual rescue. We were also able to increase the JSRC's intel manning. Instead of just two of us, there would be a total of four intel specialists in the JSRC: an Air Force Major and 1st Lieutenant during the day shift, and a Senior Airman and me working nights.

When an actual rescue event started, my main job would be to separate fact from fiction and make sure the JSRC Director had all of the information available to make an informed decision. Specific examples include the survivor's location, threats to the evader and recovery forces, available intelligence collection capabilities, adversary counter-combat search and rescue capabilities, etc. To serve this end, I used 12 channels on the classified Internet Relay Chat (mIRC) system, three rooms in Information Work Station (IWS), Falcon View, Automated Deep Operations Coordination System, and several tracking systems in addition to physically sending the SrA to the various other intelligence sections to get answers to specific questions.

Now that I'm home and have the benefit of hindsight, I wish I could say everything went smoothly all of the time, but there's just a certain amount of chaos inevitable in war. However, I can say, for the most part things went well. The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Cell (ISRC), which was established in part to provide support during recovery operations, did a fantastic job. The ISRC team consisted of 32 mission specialists per shift ranging from ground, air and air defense analysts to Predator and U2 Liaison officers. The support they provided was invaluable.

Still, to improve on success, I'd recommend having at least one personnel recovery analyst inside the ISRC

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) per shift. By working inside the SCIF, the analysts would have access to information not available in the collateral JSRC and would be able to work more closely with the ISRC team. Furthermore, the second analyst from the JSRC (in my case, the SrA) wouldn't have to go to the ISRC as often, and would thus be available to support a second rescue mission if the need should arise. Unfortunately, there literally wasn't room in the SCIF during OIF.

Another change I'd make would be to incorporate a collaboration tool specifically designed for personnel recovery. Neither mIRC nor IWS completely suited our needs, so we used them both. mIRC was our primary means of communication. I once heard someone call mIRC "the devil's tool;" now I understand why. There were times the dialogue text in mIRC moved so fast you simply couldn't read it. Plus, we couldn't control who had access to the rooms we were using. Normally, there would be approximately 200 participants in the JSRC room. However, when word spread there was an actual event in progress, the number of participants would jump to 750, which put a serious strain on the system, not to mention the dramatic increase in frivolous questions or misinformation spread by uninformed outsiders. Without any type of control mechanism, it was all too easy for inaccurate information and inappropriate questions to propagate through mIRC.

However, if there were one lesson I'd impart on those who might follow me, it would be to question everything. Too often I heard the phrase, "Someone said..." only to learn we couldn't track down who the "someone" was or any type of tangible proof to support what was supposedly said. For example, during one event, one of my colleagues informed me that rescue forces were dispatched because a pilot saw a ground-to-air symbol (GTAS) in the area. However, there was no supporting proof – no in-flight report, mission report, targeting pod footage, imagery, etc., to support such a claim. As it turned out, there was no GTAS in the vicinity, and no pilot ever claimed there was one. Mistakes like these are easy enough to make, especially in a fast paced environment. However, we quickly learned the extra time spent verifying and substantiating information could mean the difference between sending another crew into harm's way for no reason.

In retrospect, I'm fortunate and proud of being part of such a noble endeavor. The JSRC team was devoted to our singularly unique mission. While it wasn't perfect, the job got done and we left no one behind. My hope is that as long as there are those willing to venture into harm's way, there will be those that fight for their return.

“PRST” *(Continued from page 5)*

personnel recovery capabilities into a joint personnel recovery team

- Assist and support the functional and positional training of all assigned or attached JSRC, RCC, UARCC, intelligence and SERE personnel and specified CAOC and CFSOCC staffs in conventional and non-conventional personnel recovery operations while also facilitating professional education and the development of personnel recovery in USCENTCOM
- Assist in operational level deliberate and crisis personnel recovery planning, as required, and facilitate the development of suitable, feasible and acceptable personnel recovery plans
- Assist the JSRC implement procedures for intelligence support to personnel recovery operational planning and execution, including the initial intelligence debrief of recovered isolated personnel
- Assist in facilitating intelligence liaison with the Component, theater, and National intelligence agencies and organizations supporting personnel recovery operations
- Educate and train JSRC personnel to provide intelligence support to personnel recovery operations, as required
- Develop personnel recovery operational lessons learned following personnel recovery events

Additionally, JPRA deployed a four-man PRST at the request of USCENTCOM to USEUCOM (Landstuhl Regional Medical Center) and Kuwait to directly support repatriation operations for PFC Lynch and the seven other liberated POWs. HQ JPRA also provided repatriation guidance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, and Service staffs. JPRA advised the returnees’ families and assisted with the media support process by providing information packets. The repatriation team provided detailed, on-site training, and led the coordination for both Repatriation Phase I and II activities.

The PRST developed and provided USCENTCOM a comprehensive list of lessons learned from OIF. These lessons will influence the continuing transformational effort of joint and service personnel recovery policy and doctrine, training and education for commanders and their staffs, joint concept development and experimentation, and preparation of recovery forces and potentially isolated personnel.

Finally, the PRST support provided to USCENTCOM

“PRST” *(Concludes on page 10)***“Different”** *(Continued from page 7)*

executives in DoD and the U.S. Government by both Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) and the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Affairs Office (DPMO) managed the repatriation process while “feeding the [media] beast” with information designed to ensure the well-being of Private Lynch, get the necessary operational information to DoD officials in the “field,” and enhance public information and reduce speculation by the media.

As part of a more comprehensive effort to educate key DoD and U.S. Government officials about PR, JPRA has undertaken a major initiative to prevent PA problems during PR operations in the future. It has started to reshape the thinking of PAOs through a deliberate educational process by actively addressing the role of PA in PR. JPRA, in conjunction with the Defense Information School (DINFOS), is developing a personnel recovery training module for DINFOS classes at the introductory and joint levels, and incorporates many of the lessons learned from recent PR events including those that occurred in Operations ALLIED FORCE, and ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM. This will help our PA officers understand the PR mission and how to use their skills to win the information battle during future PR events.

While most PR planning and preparation focuses on the actual execution of recovery operations in the field, past examples demonstrate that we can’t ignore or treat as an afterthought, the public information aspects. A poorly considered, uneducated, or ineptly stated 30-second sound-bite can quickly destroy months of planning and positive public perceptions. More importantly, it can ultimately have a devastating effect on the well-being of those who have returned from isolation or captivity.

DoD is very fortunate that it has PA officials who are very proficient in communicating themes that support the recovery and repatriation processes and protect exploitable information. Of course this is predicated on ensuring they fully understand PR operations (especially repatriation). Since DINFOS trains virtually all DoD PA officials throughout their careers, the completed JPRA initiative to imbue an orientation on the PA aspects of PR into their training will eventually reach the entire DoD PA community (over 300 students/year). The major objective of this training is for each student to be aware of the unique challenges that personnel recovery processes, especially repatriation, present to PA officers in DoD. At the very least, they’ll know it presents challenges and turn to experts such as those in JPRA and DPMO for advice.

Effective PR (Public Relations) officers and plans are key to the success of PR (Personnel Recovery) operations. When PA officials hear the term PR, we hope that in addition to thinking of it as Public Relations, which is of course their job, that they also think of Personnel Recovery, which after all, is also their job.

Upcoming Events

Jan 21-23	SOUTHCOM Personnel Recovery Conference	Miami
Jan 23	PRAG Action Officer Meeting	Pentagon
March 16-18	Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery Conference	Wash D.C.
March 24	Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) Meeting	Pentagon
May 18-21	PACOM Personnel Recovery Conference	Hickam AFB
Aug 31-Sep 2	DoD Worldwide Personnel Recovery Conference	Wash D.C.

“Jointness” (Continued from page 6)

five years ago. If we stay the course and focus on the three strategic principles Mr. Jennings reiterates again and again, I believe we will prevail in our endeavors:

- We must continue to maintain a powerful, credible, well-trained and equipped capability to recover our personnel
- We must procure and integrate the required resources and remain committed to developing new technologies to enhance our ability to recover our personnel
- Finally, we must work with our interagency, allied, and coalition partners to ensure complete interoperability

“PRST” (Continued from page 9)

and its Components contributed immeasurably to the recovery and accountability of 100% of U.S. service members placed in harm's way during OIF, an historic first for a U.S. military engagement. As JPRA prepares for future comprehensive support to the combatant commands, lessons learned from OIF will be incorporated and applied to the PRST concept, resulting in enhanced support to the DoD. “That others may live... To return with honor”

DPMO POINTS OF CONTACT

Commercial fax number: (703) 602-1969/DSN Prefix - 499

Unclassified web page address: www.dtic.mil/dpmo/

SIPRNET address: <http://webhost.policy.osd.pentagon.smil.mil/dpmo>

NAME	NEW TELEPHONE	UNCLASSIFIED E-MAIL
Mr. Mel Richmond	(703) 699-1152	melvin.richmond@osd.mil
Col John Hobbble	(703) 699-1216	john.hobbble@osd.mil
Mr. Dan Baumgartner	(703) 699-1256	daniel.baumgartner@osd.mil
Ms Kathy Weyenberg	(703) 699-1402	kweyenberg@osd.mil
MAJ (P) Dan Shea	(703) 699-1198	daniel.shea@osd.mil
LCDR John (Eggs) Ouellette	(703) 699-1231	john.ouellette@osd.mil
Maj (Sel) Matt (VP) Van Parys	(703) 699-1213	matthew.vanparys@osd.mil

The articles presented in this newsletter represent the opinions of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office, or the Department of Defense.

Personnel Recovery Snapshots

Snippets from around the Personnel Recovery Community

As you have probably already noticed, this is a brand new feature in the quarterly newsletter. This column will run every issue. It is designed to provide "snapshots" into the world of personnel recovery--from the tactical through the strategic levels. We realize OPS-TEMPO continues at breakneck speed, and sometimes it is tough to find time to craft a major article for any publication. This venue will allow the mission-hackers out there to send us a paragraph on new ideas, questions that we should pose to the community, results of exercises and operations, and innovative solutions to personnel recovery technological challenges--and also provide windows into how the operators in the field approach the transformation of personnel recovery. All we ask from you is a paragraph, your name, unit, phone number (Comm and DSN), and dates, if applicable. We publish the newsletters at the end of each quarter. We would greatly appreciate your snapshots by the end of the first month of each quarter or by October 31st, January 31st, April 30th, or July 31st respectively. Everyone has time for a paragraph so don't be shy.

JPRA Opens New Personnel Recovery Course for Allies

In October 2003, JPRA presented its first ever *Personnel Recovery Fundamentals for Allies and Coalition Partners*, otherwise known as PR-103, to over 25 NATO and Partners for Peace officers from the international personnel recovery community. The course was structured much like the *Fundamentals of Personnel Recovery* (PR-101) offered to U.S. personnel at JPRA's Training Facility in Fredericksburg, Virginia. While geared towards the newcomers, JPRA presented the first course to more experienced personnel in order to solicit feedback as part of the course validation process. Staffs should contact Ms. Erica Sato at JPRA, 540-361-7363 for more course information.

USCENTCOM Hosts Personnel Recovery Conference

USCENTCOM held its semi-annual personnel recovery conference at NSA Bahrain, October 27-30, 2003. Representatives from OSD, DoD, JPRA, JSOC and the various component RCCs participated in the conference. The objectives of the conference were to provide update briefings from the RCCs to other members of the command, identify and capture training and equipment requirements across the command, and provide information to the attendees to take back to their units. The next USCENTCOM personnel recovery conference is scheduled for March 2004.

MAJ Dan Shea, 703-699-1198.

Denmark's "HOME RUN"

The Danish military held its annual joint special forces combat search and rescue exercise HOME RUN in Karup, Denmark, October 21-24, 2003. Copenhagen provided CSAR-



Denmark's special forces simulate extracting aircrew members during Exercise HOME RUN.

trained teams to fight with coalition forces in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, but relied on the presence of U.S. CSAR-capable recovery platforms. Denmark's military

would like to participate in more coalition training ("train as they fight") both in the U.S. and Denmark.

Ms. Kathy Weyenberg, 703-699-1402.

Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery Conference

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will sponsor an Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery Conference March 16-18, 2004, in Arlington, Virginia. The purpose of this conference is to examine intelligence support to the personnel recovery mission and will focus on three key areas: (1) intelligence support to planning and preparing for personnel recovery; (2) Non-conventional Assisted Recovery, and (3) intelligence support to personnel recovery mission execution.

The first day will consist of background briefs to conference attendees on Intelligence Community (IC) assets available to personnel recovery forces. On the second day, attendees will divide into workshops to discuss what the various elements of the IC need to do to support personnel recovery, as well as identify the areas needing improvement. Each workshop will develop input for the ongoing effort to develop a Department of Defense Instruction outlining the roles and responsibilities of organizations supporting personnel recovery intelligence.

Capt Matt Van Parys, 703-699-1213.

Army Holds First Personnel Recovery Meeting

The Army personnel recovery office facilitated the first Army personnel recovery meeting November 13-14, 2003, in Fredericksburg, Virginia, in accordance with the new Army personnel recovery policy. It included representatives from the Army Staff Directorates, Army Components, and major commands. It provided education and training to all participants, discussed the new policy and its objectives, and developed the initial topics for the commands to conduct a mission analysis in preparation for the first Army-wide Personnel Recovery Conference tentatively scheduled for Feb 04. MG Robinson, the Army's Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, provided opening remarks on the historical nature and statistics of U.S. Army warfare and personnel recovery, recent Army personnel recovery events in both OEF/OIF, and the near-term way ahead for Army personnel recovery development. The Army Chief of Staff signed the new Army personnel recovery policy on December 15, 2003. Formal transmittal via the web is pending office of general counsel review.

Mr. Mike Dozier, HQDA PR Office, 703-614-6553.



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